update(blog)!: Add iOS vs Android Security article#3140
update(blog)!: Add iOS vs Android Security article#3140friadev wants to merge 70 commits intoprivacyguides:mainfrom
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Signed-off-by: redoomed1 <redoomed1@privacyguides.org>
Signed-off-by: redoomed1 <redoomed1@privacyguides.org>
Signed-off-by: redoomed1 <redoomed1@privacyguides.org>
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Very good article, but those are my suggestions
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| There's also the matter of some permissions only being available in certain regions: Apparently, Chinese iPhones have a granular [network permission](https://sspai.com/post/35720) that can allow you grant specific apps network access. This would be a huge security improvement on iOS, and it's a feature that's already been implemented so it's quite confusing why they wouldn't ship this feature globally. | ||
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| These permissions might protect you from third-party apps, but Apple's own apps can actually [bypass the system permissions](https://blog.xpnsec.com/bypassing-macos-privacy-controls/#:~:text=A%20quick%20review%20of%20Calendar's,How%20can%20we%20subvert%20this?). Allowing their own apps privileged access in the system is, in my opinion, both a privacy and security issue. This means that any Apple app could access your camera, microphone, etc without you knowing about it. I'd like to see Apple not make their own apps privileged, I think that would make users more comfortable and give them more control over their system. |
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The article linked mention them doing so on macOS. Is there more direct evidence of them doing so on iOS? I know they bypass the VPN Tunnel.
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| FingerprintJS supports [Android devices](https://dev.fingerprint.com/docs/native-android-integration) and claims it can identify the same device after it restarts, after app data/cache is cleared, after the app is deleted and reinstalled, after a factory reset, even if the app is installed in different profiles or user accounts. This is particularly upsetting since many people use Android profiles to separate out their activities. | ||
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| I hope Google will see app fingerprinting as a real problem and take steps to mitigate it, especially between factory resets and profiles. I feel that those are the most important boundaries to uphold: a factory reset should be a clean slate, and a separate profile should be almost like a separate phone. |
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I feel like this should be tested by you or other team members who have a secondary Android (ideally Pixel GrapheneOS) device. Especially the factory reset claim. Fingerprint.com have an obvious economic interest to pump up their claim.
List of changes proposed in this PR:
closes privacyguides/article-ideas#39